

Ibadan Journal of Peace & Development
Vol. 10 No. 1 February 2020 pp.43-55

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement and Implications for Border Security Management of the Nigeria-Benin Borders

Akhigbe, Allwell Oseahume

Abstract

This paper interrogates the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement and the implications for border security management of the Nigeria-Benin borders. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons was enacted in 1979 to ensure the free flow of persons, goods and services deemed crucial to attaining economic integration. Despite the benefits of the Protocol including promotion of free trade and commerce as well as easy exchange of human resources across the border, severe challenges still persist including the concomitant increase in Transnational Organized Crimes (TOCs) that are a signature of African borders. Human trafficking is a particularly notorious crime that this paper pays attention to due to the emphasis by the ECOWAS Common Approach to Migration of 2008. Porosity of the borders and inefficient border facilities are also obstacles. Unofficial routes have sprung up thereby compounding the issue of policing these borders. It is important that the governments of Nigeria and Benin and the ECOWAS authorities begin to reconsider the effects of the protocol in the light of the current realities. This paper makes the case for a more proactive implementation of the ECOWAS protocol by installation and maintenance of sound border facilities, creation of an external border for the region and an efficient information management system in the region.

Keywords: ECOWAS Protocol, Transnational organized crimes, free movement, border security

Introduction

Borders have emerged to be sites of crime that indicate the dysfunction of the state (Lamptey 2013, Asiwaju 2018). The porosity of the nation's borders especially to the west with Benin makes it imperative that the security implications be critically examined. This paper argues that the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement contributes to the insecurity of the Nigeria-Benin borders. This paper introduces the regional body of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the instrument that facilitates ease of movement across the borders which is the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, Rights of Residence and Establishment. It then considers border security management in the light of the Same border shared by Nigeria-Benin before making some important recommendations to enhance the implementation of the Protocol as regards good border management. The paper is concerned with just the free movement aspect of the Protocol. A discussion of the rights of residence and establishment is outside the purview of this paper.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the regional organisation created in 1975 to promote the economic growth and development of member states (Nigeria Ministry of External Affairs, 1991). Major

integration drivers such as Nigerian Head of State General Yakubu Gowon and President of Togo, GnassingbeEyadema sought that the states worked in concert to spark rapid growth as well as present a united front as a powerful bloc in world politics (Gowon, 1984).

The organization has an effective structure that depicts a top-down approach. At the top is the Authority of Heads of State and Government. It is followed closely by the Council of Ministers as well as the secretariat based in Abuja, Nigeria which serves as its administrative arm. The secretariat coordinates the activities of the organisation in all fifteen member states.

The focus of the organisation has shifted from solely economic issues due to changing socio-political situations in several of the states over the years (Adeniran, 2012). The region has been riddled with internecine conflicts that have crippled the governance structures and created socio-political complications. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the security arm of the organisation has intervened in deadly conflicts in the region such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mali in a bid to restore the peace and harmony (Lar, 2007). This unfortunately draws the focus away from its primary aim of sparking the growth and development of the economies of its member states. One of the most prominent economic initiatives is the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services which is the subject of this study.

ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment was promulgated in 1979. It is arguably one of the most important instruments of the organisation. In fact, the Protocol has been hailed as the most sophisticated free movement mechanism in all of Africa (MiWorc 2017). The Protocol was borne out of the realization that easy movement of human and material resources was indispensable to the stated goal of provoking joint economic development of the states in the area (Opanike et al 2015; Lar, 2007). It was only logical that to achieve this, the member states should be free to call on the very best human and material resources to facilitate the growth desired. (ECOWAS Commission, 2008) . The Protocol thus emerged at the most appropriate time for the community.

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement abolished the need for visas in travel across the West African region. The Protocol involves three parts- the free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment. These three parts were to be enforced consecutively every five years (ECOWAS Protocol, 1979). Whereas, the Protocol is intended to facilitate the intra-regional movement, it is subject to very important constraints which are important to emphasise. One of which is the time constraint. The community citizens according to Article 3 (2) are only permitted by the Protocol to reside in member states without the

typical visa requirements up to 90 days (ECOWAS Protocol, 1979). This implies that after the stipulated time, the citizen would be expected to follow the normal procedure that pertains in the state in which the individual resides as regards residence and other procedures required for foreigners. Therefore, if such a citizen exceeds the time frame without notifying the appropriate authorities, such a person would have extended beyond the mandate of the Protocol and be liable to prosecution if determined by the host state. The intention behind this is to provide the state with the upper hand in deciding who remains within its borders.

Another important aspect of the Protocol is captured in Article 3 (1) which states that the citizen must have appropriate travel documents and an international health certificate to be able to benefit from the instrument. This suggests that the Protocol is not laissez-faire for unbridled migration across the borders of West Africa (Ayamga, 2014). Inasmuch as the authorities of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seek to make the borders easily accessible to the community citizens, it simultaneously desires to ensure that they are safe for the benefit of the national security of each member state. This adheres to the tenet of good border management which seeks to keep out threats to the state while ensuring easy navigation of the borders (Bertozzi 2008).

Article 4 arguably gives the most power of enforcement to states as far as the Protocol on Free Movement is concerned. The enactment of an instrument that guarantees free passage across a state's border connotes a vital loss of a state's prestige. This is because one of the hallmarks of sovereignty of a state is determining who goes in and out of its territory (Okunade&Ogunnubi, 2018). Sovereignty itself refers to the ability of a state to retain control of the people within its territory and their affairs (Bauder, 2017). Thus, taking away this ability to screen people indiscriminately can be seen as a weakening of a state's power. Therefore, this article serves as an important counter measure that states could take to assert their national interest especially if it goes against the regional interest in favour of intra-regional migration. A state can consider a community citizen to be a danger to its internal security. This is despite the citizen observing other parts of the Protocol such as possession of valid travel documents as well as the international health certificate (Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018). In this light, a state can thus securitise such a citizen as a threat and deny him the free movement across its borders. This puts a check on the ability of cross-border criminals for instance to flee across borders and carry out their nefarious activities.

Benefits of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement undoubtedly has several benefits that have accrued to the community citizens as a result of its existence and implementation.

One of such is the easier movement of human and material resources within the region. With the implementation of the Protocol, it is a lot easier for people and goods to move quickly within the community (Nigeria Ministry of External Affairs,1991).This is particularly important for commerce which thrives on having access to the right labour and capital to attain maximum profits. The bureaucratic controls hitherto experienced at the borders of West Africa have been lifted. The typical waiting period for issuance of visa has been bypassed as well as the uncertainty of the process. Resources can be quickly mobilised and deployed to the West African regions that need them.

In addition, the Protocol has galvanised economic integration in the region. The easier movement of resources has brought the economies of member-states closer and more dependent on each other (Aduloju, 2017). This portends better prospects for the relatively weaker economies in the region. They are able to leverage on their comparative advantage and thrive in the common economy that this instrument aims to create. It is in line with the vision of the founding fathers of the organisation that free mobility of labour across the region is

indispensable to the economic integration in the community (Gowon, 1984).

Seme Border

Seme Border is the biggest border between Nigeria and Benin. In fact, Seme border has been referred to as the busiest border in West Africa due to its strategic location between the bustling cities of Lagos and Cotonou in Nigeria and Benin respectively (Nigerian Customs Service, 2018). It is located in Badagry West Local Government Area. It is the major land border between the two states and accounts for much of the transactions that bring in a lot of revenue between both states (Adeleye, 2017). The Seme border however has been in a state of disrepair and dysfunction for a long time until recently in 2018 with the inauguration of an ultra-modern facility in October, 2018. It had acquired a reputation for being one of Africa's most notorious borders. Transnational organised crimes such as human trafficking, contraband smuggling and small arms and light weapons (SALW) are prominent signatures of the Seme border. The facilities for manning the borders are antiquated.

Border Security Management

Border security management is an integral part of the security of any state. The borders define the sovereignty of a state and mark off the point at which a state has influence over its affairs. This implies that the border is at the heart of a

state's security (Onuoha, 2013). Any attempt to violate the borders of a state is often rebuffed. In fact, throughout history, borders have been the leading cause of conflicts between states (Laine, 2015).

Therefore, borders have often been very rigid and securitized. Movement across borders have been heavily regulated with the intention to screen out threats on the one hand and also deter unnecessary migration to other states on the other (Laine, 2015). This reality has gradually changed due to the contemporary times in which we live in. In today's globalised world, people, goods and services criss-cross borders every time due to the interconnectedness of the age. This has led to the need for a revised understanding of border security management. Good border security management now refers to the ease of moving across borders while simultaneously keeping out national security threats (Lampthey, 2013; Bertozzi, 2008). Today's emphasis is on making the process as seamless as possible. This does not discountenance the need for security consciousness as the border agencies simply deploy more technology to effectively screen out the threats. Bertozzi (2008) is of the opinion that border agencies should take care not to stifle economic activities in the bid to enhance border security.

Effective border security management relies heavily on the collaboration with the border agencies of other states to be successful. This is

because in order to remove the existing roadblocks to the smooth transactions at the borders, the officials would have to rely on the use of technologies particularly on intelligence gathering to able to filter out the threats that may exist to a state's security (Longo. 2016). This would only easily come from cooperation with the neighbouring state in terms of joint patrol, capacity building, communication and intelligence sharing (Bertozzi, 2008). Therefore, no state can attain effective border security management in isolation. It would need all the help it can get from its neighbours.

Implications of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement for Border Security

This paper is particularly concerned with the implications that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement has for border security management.

Poor Detection of Threats to National Security

The ECOWAS Protocol has contributed to the poor capacity of border security agencies to determine threats to the national security. The advantage of pre-screening of travellers for visa issuance is the ability of the border agencies to determine who is coming into the country and what the purpose is (Leonard, 2010; Zampagni, 2017). It helps to provide the host state with advance information that is useful in determining if a person or group of persons constitute a threat to the national interests. A

visa can then be issued after determining that the migrant has legitimate reasons to move across the borders into the state. The ECOWAS Protocol currently negates against this by allowing the influx of all and sundry without the scrutiny of relevant checks such as these. This allows for mixed migration where different criminal elements could hide among legitimate migrants to cross en masse into Nigeria or Benin (UNODC 2018).

Increase in Transnational Organised Crimes especially human trafficking

Transnational Organised Crimes are criminal acts that are carried out by structured gangs for profit across the borders of several states. Recently, such crimes have become a signature of West African borders (Onuoha 2013; Opanike et al 2015; Asiwaju 2018) The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons has inadvertently led to increased human trafficking in the West African region. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime considers human trafficking as the act of recruiting, transporting or receiving a person through coercion or deception for the purpose of exploitation in the forms of sex, forced labour or organ harvesting (UNODC, 2016). This type of transnational organised crime has become so notorious that it is the only one singled out by ECOWAS in its 2008 Common Approach on Migration to be combatted as a moral and humanitarian imperative (ECOWAS Commission, 2008).

Human trafficking gangs have taken advantage of this to ensure the perpetuation of the so-called “modern-day slavery” in the 21st century (Adeleye 2017). The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement has contributed to the laxity of border officials on both sides of the divide to the issue of human trafficking and other Transnational Organised Crimes (TOCs). The lack of observance by the border officials such as the Nigerian Immigration Service is further compounded by the infiltration of the top ranks of these agencies by the elite heads of the trafficking gangs (Adeleye, 2017). The heads of these gangs are wealthy traffickers with sophisticated networks across Europe, Asia and America. They exert pressure on the weak institutional structures of the border agencies and are able to sway them to their side as a result of their clout (Adeleye, 2017).

Improper awareness and implementation of the Protocol

A major consequence for border security of this free movement instrument is improper awareness and implementation of the Protocol. There is reason to believe that the meaning and import of the Protocol have been misunderstood especially by the community citizens (Elumelu, 2014). The instrument has been interpreted to mean movement across West African borders without any form of identification whatsoever. Thus, citizens troop en masse over the borders and appear puzzled

when quizzed by border officials for relevant travel documents (Haas, 2006; Ayamga, 2014). Such misconception is dangerous as it could lead to the outbreak of violence and hostility in the process of enforcing the law. Citizens also prefer to use porous routes at the borders rather than the official ones (UNODC, 2018). This inconceivably occurs even when they have the relevant travel documents such as the ECOWAS passport and health certificate. This action springs from the belief that official border procedures are burdensome and tenuous such that citizens would rather contravene the law than follow it (Agbedahin, 2014). Implementation is also subject to political dynamics of member states. In early 1983 and in mid-1985, the Nigerian Government revoked Articles 4 and 27 of the Protocol to expel over 1 million illegal aliens mostly Ghanaians (Adepoju, 2005a).

Increase in corruption among border officials

The Protocol has also led to corruption among the hierarchy of border officials (Haas, 2006; Agbedahin, 2014). The intention of the protocol was to ensure easy movement of people across the borders while keeping out threats to national security (Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018). ECOWAS thus set out to create a fairly simple system in which the ECOWAS Travel Certificate or passport as well as the Health Certificate could replace the need for visas in verifying the identity of migrants. However, the system has been hijacked by corruption in these

agencies (Agbedahin, 2014). It starts from the very process of issuance of the ECOWAS passports. The procedure is often shabbily done without recourse to detail and thorough inspection of documents presented by the citizen of the community. In Nigeria, for instance, the ECOWAS Passport can be gotten in about two hours after submission. While this could be hailed as an efficient process, it is important to point out that the citizen often has to tip off the immigration officer in order to hasten up the process. This could be done irrespective of whether the documents presented are legitimate or in consonance with the laws of the land.

Corruption is also evident in the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement. This is seen in the way and manner the provisions of the protocol are handled by the border officials (Adepoju, 2005b). The ECOWAS Protocol has been taken to mean a *laissez-passé* for just about any form of illegality where everything goes. Whereas some of the provisions of the Protocol clearly state that the individual could only pass with appropriate travel documents, it has become a form of migration en masse across the borders (Agbedahin, 2014). Scant attention is paid to scrutinising the travel documents at border posts of prominent borders of both Nigeria and Benin such as the Seme border. Businessmen easily collaborate with border officials to ensure clear passage even when lacking basic travel

documents. Trans-border Commuters in Nigeria such as ABC Transport and Cross Country frequently transport commuters across West Africa who do not have ECOWAS passports. They simply charge these citizens higher transport costs and “sort” or bribe border officials to be allowed movement across the borders. The porosity of the borders of Nigeria and Benin also create a perfect opportunity to sabotage the ECOWAS Protocol. The Protocol is presumed on the basis that the West African states have what it takes to ensure the security of their borders. These include sound facilities, latest technologies and adequately remunerated personnel. The opposite is usually the case with African borders having the unenviable reputation of being among the most porous in the world (Onuoha, 2013). This reality has provided the leeway for criminals to hijack the good intentions behind the enactment of the protocol and utilise it as the perfect cover for their illegitimate activities.

The presence of multiple illegal checkpoints at Seme border is also a contravention of the intent of the Protocol. These checkpoints are simply avenues to extort travellers of their resources even after lawfully crossing the state's borders and appear to be commonplace across the community (Haas, 2006; Aduloju, 2017). The Protocol was set up to enhance movement across the borders and not complicate it. The implementation of this noble desire at the border in Seme leaves a lot to be desired. The

checkpoints are a flagrant disregard of the tenets of the Protocol (Elumelu, 2014). They make crossing the land borders of Nigeria-Benin a dreaded affair and introduce crime and corruption in a new dimension as it is carried out openly by border officials.

Language Barriers

The language barrier poses an existential challenge to the implementation of the Free Movement Protocol of ECOWAS. Language is crucial to the co-ordination of operations across the borders (Betek et al, 2018). This is even more so as Nigeria and Benin speak different languages – the former speaks English while the latter's lingua franca is French. This development arose due to the difference in colonialism. The idea of the regional integration seeks to transcend the linguistic differences to unite the people of different cultures that make up the community (Adeniran, 2012). Overcoming the language barrier is simply the first step as the languages also harbour distinct cultures that would also need to be brought together. It is therefore appalling that the border officials at the Nigeria and Benin borders are often not bilingual (Ayamga, 2014; Aduloju, 2017). This implies that the border officials have inadequate knowledge of French and English required to carry out basic conversations that would ensure smooth entry and exit across the borders. This is a major problem because the inability to communicate effectively between

the border officials and community citizens easily breeds room for hostility. Border officials typically come across as hostile and aggressive whereas travellers are impatient when the language differences come into play. The governments of Nigeria and Benin have to invest heavily in bilingual trainings for the border agencies to build their capacity in both languages. The ability to do that would go a long way in ensuring the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement.

Recommendations

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement is a very important instrument to foster economic integration in the region. While it has been crucial to the development of the member states for over 4 decades, it is in dire need of reform to enable it become more effective. To do this, the author draws lessons from the free movement instruments across the world that ECOWAS could domesticate to get better results.

First, there is the need for an external border for the region. ECOWAS has succeeded in abolishing the internal borders within the community. This implies that one can easily move across these borders with ease thanks to the Protocol that does not require one to have a visa. The benefits of these have involved easy movement of people, goods and services across the region. ECOWAS however lacks a common external border. It has been unable to create a joint border of all 16 states that screens people from outside the region who want to come into

the community (Elumelu 2014). The consequence is that a member state cannot easily vouch for the security of the other as each state is responsible for its own security. This does not augur well for the community in the age of globalization where states face similar threats. These threats include terrorism, viral diseases, arms proliferation and drug smuggling. The West African region was thrown into chaos a few years back when Ebola broke out and spread rather easily from state to state (Faleye,2017).

ECOWAS can take some lessons from the European Union in this regard. The external border of the Schengen Area screens travellers from whatever point of entry into the European Union. This is a buffer to the security of each member state as security threats are rebuffed and prevented from entering into any part of the region (Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018). There is also a joint organization that manages the external borders of the European Union that is lacking in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). FRONTEX effectively co-ordinates the external borders of the region by facilitating co-operation amongst border agencies of member states and data-sharing (Leonard 2010).

In addition, it is important that ECOWAS develops an effective data sharing system such as the EU Visa Information System. The European Union has the Visa Information System that ensures that all member states are

kept abreast of potential security threats (Bertozzi, 2008). ECOWAS should create a sound information sharing system in the region. This is imperative to complement the ease of movement that the ECOWAS Protocol aims at attaining. The drawback of making migration seamless across borders within a particular region is the very present likelihood that it could be taken advantage of by criminal elements (Bertozzi, 2008). This is where the need for sound intelligence information and sharing systems come into play. It is crucial that ECOWAS designs an operational system for sharing intelligence on security threats across the region in real time. Unfortunately, a lot remains to be done in this regard. The border agencies of West Africa have been rather slow to adopt prominent technologies at their land, sea and air borders (Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018). In the 21st century, manual searches are still the order of the day at the region's entry and exit points. This lack of reliance on technology hinders the development of a sophisticated intelligence sharing mechanism among member states. ECOWAS lacks such a system and has undermined the essence of the Protocol in its absence. The lack of coordination in data sharing has giving the West African borders the unenviable reputation of having some of Africa's most notorious borders. Criminals can move from one state to another unhindered and avoid detection by security agents. Improper documentation of migrants is also another consequence of this as the details of these

people are not properly archived by ECOWAS for future purposes.

Conclusion

This paper argues that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement has inadvertently heightened the border insecurity for Nigeria and Benin. This is in spite of the measured benefits including promotion of intra-regional trade, easier movement of human and material resources and economic integration. The negative implications of the ECOWAS Protocol to border security include rise in transnational organised crimes such as human trafficking, poor detection of threats to national security, improper awareness of the Protocol, increased corruption by border officials, inadequate cooperation of border agencies and language barriers. ECOWAS needs to mitigate these challenges as it prepares to transform into an ECOWAS of Peoples in 2020. Therefore, it should create and manage an external border for the region, formulate an efficient information sharing system and maintain smart borders with the latest technologies.

References

- Adeniran A.I. (2012). Regional Integration in the ECOWAS Region: Challenges and Opportunities. *Backgrounder*. No 19.
- Adeleye M. (2017). Victims, Actors and Violence: Human Trafficking and Prostitution in Communities Along Nigeria-Benin Republic Border. *IFRA-Nigeria Working Paper Series*, 35. Retrieved from <http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/victims-actors-and-violence-human-trafficking-and-prostitution-in-communities-along-nigeria-benin-republic-border.pdf>, 3-14,
- Adepoju A. (2005a). Creating a Borderless West Africa: Constraints and Prospects for Intra-Regional Migration. *Migration Without Borders Series*, 2-11
- Adepoju A. (2005b). Migration in West Africa. *a paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration*, (2005)p 7
- Aduloju A. A. (2017). ECOWAS and Free Movement of Persons: African Women as Cross-Border Victims. *Journal of International Women Studies*. Vol 18 (4):90-100.
- Agbedahin K.(2014). From Control to Parasitism. *African Security Review*, 23(4), 370-380

- Asiwaju A.I. (2018). The Analytical Framework. in A.I. Asiwaju (Ed.) *Border Regions in Africa: History of Political Marginalization and Infrastructural Deprivation in Ogun State of South-Western Nigeria*. Ibadan: University Press PLC. 5-16.
- Ayamga V. (2014). *An Assessment of Implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services at the Ghana-Burkina Faso Border*. (Published Master's Thesis). Legon: Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana)
- Bauder, H.2017. *Migration Borders Freedom*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Bertozzi S. (2008). Schengen: Achievements and Challenges in Managing an Area Encompassing 3.6 Million km². *CEPS Working Document*, 284. 5-12
- Betek C. M., Fayomi O.O. & Agboola M.G. (2018). Cross Border Movement and Language Barriers in West Africa. *Acta Universitatis Danubis*. Vol 11 (1). 5-15
- Elumelu T.L. (2014). "Promoting Labour Mobility through Regional Cooperation: The Case of ECOWAS." *Workshop on Strengthening the Collection and Use of International Migration Data for Development*. (2014). pp 4-7
- ECOWAS Commission (2008). *ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration*, (2008). 2-5
- Faley O. (2017). *Sociospatial Networks and Transborder Epidemic Surveillance in West Africa: The Ebola Outbreak of 2014-2015 in Perspective*. *Nigerian Health Journal*, 17 (3). 61-69
- Gowon Y. (1984). *The Economic Community of West African States: A Study in Political and Economic Integration*. (Unpublished PhD Dissertation). Warwick: Department of Politics, University of Warwick.
- Lar J.T. (2007). Free Movement, Migration and Xenophobia in ECOWAS: A Call for More Attention. In Conflict Security and Development Fellows (Eds.) *Perspectives on West Africa's Future*. London: King's College. 23-28.
- Laine J.P. (2015). A Historical View on the Study of Borders. In S.V. Sevastianov, J.P. Laine & A. A. Kireev (Eds.) *Introduction to Border Studies*. Vladivostok: Dalnouka. 15
- Lamprey A.A. (2013). Rethinking Border Management Strategies in West Africa: Experiences from the Sahel. *Policy Brief 12*, 12
- Leonard S. (2010). EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices, *European Security*, 19 (2). 233
- Longo, M. (2016). A 21st Century Border? Cooperative Border Controls in the United States and the European Union after 9/11. *Journal of Borderland Studies*. 31.2:187-202

- Migrating for Work Research Consortium (MiWORC) (2017). *A Region without Borders? Policy Frameworks for Regional Labour Migration towards South Africa*. Witwatersrand: African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS), University of Witwatersrand.15
- Nigeria Customs Service (2018). *Customs Duty* [Television Series] Abuja: Nigeria Television Authority
- Nigeria Ministry of External Affairs (1991). *Nigeria and the ECOWAS Since 1985: Towards A Dynamic Regional Integration*. Lagos: Ministry of External Affairs.20-39.
- Onuoha F.C. (2013). *Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria*, Doha: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.
- Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating To Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment
- Opanike A., Aduloju. A.A., & Adenipekun, L. O. (2015). *ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement and Trans-border Security in West Africa*. *Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs*, 3(1) 43
- Okunade S.K. (2015). *The Nigeria Immigration Service and the Challenges of Managing Illegal Routes in Oyo State, Nigeria*. (Unpublished Master's Thesis). (Ibadan: Institute of African Studies. University of Ibadan, 2015)
- Okunade S.K. and Ogunnubi O. (2018). *A Schengen Agreement in Africa? African Agency and the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement*. *Journal of Borderland Studies*. DOI:10.1080/08865655.2018.1530128.
- United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (2018). *Global Study on Migration*. Vienna: UNODC 20-83.
- United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (2016). *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, (Vienna: UNODC, 2016) p 14
- Zampagni F. (2017). *The Making of the Schengen Visa Regime: Visa Filtering at the Italian Consulate in Senegal*. In P. Gaibazzi, A. Bellagamba & S. Dunnwald (Eds.) *EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management: Political Cultures, Contested Spaces and Ordinary Lives*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 157-177.